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*C.J.Q. 192  Introduction   
One of the most important decisions that a litigant must now consider is whether to settle 
without trial. Pre-action protocols emphasise that disputants should file a court claim only as a 
last resort.
1
 If they institute legal proceedings, the court is under the duty of active case 
management to encourage the use of an alternative dispute resolution (ADR) procedure where 
appropriate.
2
 Consequently, a successful party runs the risk of being ordered to pay the 
opponent's costs if it has unreasonably refused to agree to settlement negotiations.
3
   
Of all the various processes to resolve a dispute voluntarily, the Government, judiciary and 
Lord Woolf's Reports on Access to Justice gave prominence to mediation. Mediation 
confidentiality occupies a place of considerable importance in the reformed civil justice system. 
It enhances the prospects of settlement, founded on the empirical assumption that a secure and 
private negotiating sphere facilitates a frank exchange of views between the parties.
4
 It also 
prevents the parties from taking a tactical advantage of the evidence passed in mediation by 
adducing it in subsequent proceedings.  
Generally a mediator will say in the opening statement that communications made in the 
process are without prejudice. The mediator and all the mediation participants will sign an 
agreement with express obligations of non-disclosure.
5
 However, the legal protection for 
mediation confidentiality is far from absolute. This article seeks to analyse the limited 
protection afforded by the without prejudice rule, mediation agreement and legal professional 
privilege where it applies. It then *C.J.Q. 193  appraises the role of statutory intervention in 
light of the US Uniform Mediation Act
6
 and the EU Mediation Directive.
7
 It concludes by 
arguing that there is a strong case for mediation privilege in the English civil justice system.  
The without prejudice rule   
The without prejudice rule has been fundamental to the administration of civil justice. This rule 
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renders inter-party communications made in aid of settlement both inadmissible in evidence 
and immune from disclosure.
8
 The court may, however, deviate from this rule in exceptional 
circumstances. Preserving confidentiality in settlement negotiations is all the more important 
after the Civil Procedure Rules (CPR) came into force, where the court must facilitate just and 
peaceful resolution of disputes in accordance with the overriding objective. In the absence of a 
secure and private negotiating sphere, the parties would be reluctant to unveil their genuine 
needs and generate compromise options for fear that what they say could be used to their 
disadvantage in subsequent proceedings.  
The primary justification for this rule is the public policy of encouraging the parties to resolve 
their differences rather than litigate them to a finish. In Cutts v Head, 
9
 Oliver L.J. said,  
“ parties should be encouraged so far as possible to settle their disputes without resort to 
litigation and should not be discouraged by the knowledge that anything that is said in the 
course of such negotiations (and that includes, of course, as much the failure to reply to an offer 
as an actual reply) may be used to their prejudice in the course of the proceedings. They 
should … be encouraged freely and frankly to put their cards on the table”   
Hoffmann L.J. (as he then was) pointed out the contractual basis of the rule in Muller v Linsley 
& Mortimer 
10
 :  
“ Cutts v Head shows that the rule has two justifications. Firstly, the public policy of 
encouraging parties to negotiate and settle their disputes out of court and, secondly, an implied 
agreement arising out of what is commonly understood to be the consequences of offering or 
agreeing to negotiate without prejudice. In some cases both of these justifications are present; 
in others, only one or the other.”   
*C.J.Q. 194  These two reasons are interrelated. Policy considerations promote settlement 
discussions. Once the parties have agreed to negotiate on a without prejudice basis, elementary 
justice requires the law to uphold the consensus that their communications should be 
inadmissible and privileged.
11
 More significant still, the combined effect of these reasons 
offers good guidance in resolving a difficult issue of principle.  
There has been some disagreement as to the extent of the without prejudice protection. In 
Muller, 
12
 Hoffmann L.J. stated that the without prejudice rule only prevented the use of 
settlement negotiations to prove the truth of the facts admitted. He applied this line of 
reasoning in Bradford & Bingley Plc v Rashid, 
13
 distinguishing acknowledgments under 
s.29(5) of the Limitation Act 1980 from inadmissible admissions. Taking a different view in 
Unilever Plc v Procter & Gamble Co, 
14
 Robert Walker L.J. (as he then was) emphatically 
rejected this categorical approach. He warned against the practical difficulties involved in 
separating admissions from the rest of the without prejudice communications. Such limited 
protection, he explained, would be contrary to the underlying objective of encouraging the 
parties to speak freely about all issues in the litigation when seeking compromise and to admit 
certain facts for the purpose of establishing a basis of compromise. In the recent decision of 
Ofulue v Bossert, 
15
 the House of Lords was asked to address this debate head on.  
Lord Neuberger of Abbotsbury, with whom Lord Hope of Craighead, Lord Rodger of 
Earlsferry and Lord Walker of Gestingthorpe concurred, approved of Robert Walker L.J.'s 
analysis as being consistent with an earlier decision in Rush & Tompkins Ltd v Greater London 
Council 
16
 and the general tenor of the courts in the nineteenth century.
17
 Having reviewed the 
authorities, his Lordship agreed that singling out admissions was too subtle to apply in 
practice.
18
 He pointed out that Lord Hoffmann's distinction rested solely on public policy and 
neglected the contractual ground of the without prejudice rule.
19
 Indeed, the other opinions in 
Rashid expressed doubt about such a distinction.
20
 Therefore, his Lordship concluded
21
 :  
“ Save perhaps where it is wholly unconnected with the issues between the parties to the 
proceedings, a statement in without prejudice negotiations should not be admissible in 
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evidence, other than in exceptional circumstances such as those mentioned in the Unilever case 
[2000] 1 WLR 2436, 2444d-2445g.”   
*C.J.Q. 195  It is now clear that the without prejudice rule is generous in its application. 
Statements made by the parties
22
 and those obtained from non-parties
23
 receive protection 
automatically,
24
 provided that they form part of a genuine attempt to arrive at an agreed 
resolution
25
 of an issue being litigated between the parties. The without prejudice protection 
belongs to all the participants of a settlement discussion. It does not attach to particular 
proceedings. For this reason Lord Neuberger was right to say that,  
“ it would set an unfortunate precedent if your Lordships held that an admission of the 
claimant's title in a without prejudice letter [written with a view to settling earlier proceedings 
between the parties] was sufficiently remote from the issues in a possession action relating to 
the same land as to be outside the rule.” 26   
Wide as the protection may seem, the effectiveness of the without prejudice rule depends on its 
limits. Three of such restraints stand out in particular: where a mutual waiver exists, a 
well-established exception applies and a without prejudice statement is in no way connected 
with the merits of the cause being litigated.  
A waiver is an agreement of all the parties participating in a settlement discussion, which 
allows without prejudice communications to be disclosed and used in subsequent litigation.
27
 It 
is common to waive the right of non-disclosure to reduce the parties' liabilities as to costs. For 
example, in both Chantrey Vellacott v Convergence Group Plc 
28
 and Carleton (Earl of 
Malmesbury) v Strutt & Parker (A Partnership), 
29
 the parties placed their mediation 
communications before the court for the determination of costs. It should be noted that an 
appropriate costs order may take into account the unreasonable position taken by a party in a 
mediation,
30
 and even include the winning party's costs of a failed mediation.
31
   
Absent such a mutual waiver, either party may rely on protected material in subsequent 
proceedings where an exception to the without prejudice rule applies. There are numerous 
exceptions to the rule. Robert Walker L.J. in Unilever 
32
 pointed out eight of the most 
important instances. It is convenient for the purpose of exposition to classify them into three 
categories. The first group of exceptions aims to uphold agreements between the parties. As 
has already been noted, the central goal of the without prejudice rule is to promote and 
maintain public confidence in agreed settlements. To determine whether without prejudice 
communications resulted in a concluded compromise the courts need to look at them.
33
 
Alternatively, such communications are admissible because they may *C.J.Q. 196  contain 
“ the offer and acceptance forming a contract which has replaced the cause of action previously 
in dispute” .34 An illustration of the application of this exception is Brown v Rice. 35 The issue 
for the court was whether the parties had settled in a mediation that took place shortly before 
the trial. Stuart Isaacs QC, sitting as a High Court judge, admitted into evidence the mediator's 
manuscript, his correspondence to the parties, and testimonial evidence of what the parties had 
said and done in the mediation. The judge reasoned that recognised exceptions to the without 
prejudice rule would apply in mediation even though it is a form of assisted without prejudice 
negotiation.
36
 Nonetheless, he found that the second respondent's offer to settle was incomplete 
because it did not deal with the manner of disposing the litigation. Thus, the offer was 
incapable of being accepted to form an agreed settlement.  
Where, even if there is no concluded compromise, a party made a clear and unambiguous 
statement with the intention that the other party to the without prejudice negotiations would 
rely on it and in fact did so, the statement may be put in evidence to raise an estoppel.
37
 This 
exception is founded on the grounds that it would be plainly unconscionable to allow the first 
party to hide behind the cloak of without prejudice.
38
 It is consistent with the exception of 
proving the existence of a settlement agreement discussed above.
39
 In Brown, 
40
 the second 
respondent made an oral offer to settle during a mediation, which remained open for 
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acceptance until midday on the following day. The applicant purportedly accepted the offer by 
fax within the acceptance period. However, an express term in the mediation agreement 
required that any settlement agreement must be in writing and signed by or on behalf of each of 
the parties. The applicant argued that giving effect to the express term would deprive the 
acceptance period of any meaning. The argument was one of estoppel, although the applicant 
relied on an implied waiver of the term instead. Stuart Isaacs QC rejected both grounds, 
holding that the express term laid down formality requirements for a settlement agreement, 
whereas the acceptance period was only relevant to the question of whether there was such an 
agreement.
41
 Thus, the express term could not render the existence of the acceptance period 
otiose.  
Quite apart from proving an intended settlement or unambiguous statement, without prejudice 
communications may come to light where the parties varied the rule's application by 
agreement.
42
 Communications that are “ without prejudice except as to costs” 43 provide an 
apparent example. In Reed Executive Plc v Reed Business Information Ltd, 
44
 the claimant 
sought an order of disclosure of without prejudice negotiations on the basis that the defendant's 
refusal to mediate was relevant to the question of costs. Jacob L.J. held that the court had no 
jurisdiction *C.J.Q. 197  to compel disclosure of such negotiations, even though that might 
prevent it from determining the reasonableness of a refusal to participate in an ADR process.
45
 
It is clear, therefore, that settlement negotiations remain inadmissible and immune from 
disclosure unless the parties stated that they are “ without prejudice save as to costs” .  
The second group of exceptions permits judicial control over the fairness of settlement 
agreements. Evidence of without prejudice negotiations is admissible to show that a concluded 
compromise should be set aside on grounds of misrepresentation, fraud or undue influence.
46
 
Such an issue arose in Ruttle Plant Hire Ltd v Secretary of State for the Environment, Food and 
Rural Affairs 
47
 and Farm Assist Ltd (In Liquidation) v Secretary of State for the Environment, 
Food and Rural Affairs. 
48
 The claimant in each case sought to set aside a mediated settlement 
on the basis of economic duress. At the interlocutory stage, Ramsey J. refused to strike out the 
claim in Ruttle Plant and declined to set aside a witness summons for the mediator in Farm 
Assist. The judge was right in reaching these conclusions, for it is in the interests of justice to 
find out and disapprove settlement agreements that were entered into against one's free will.  
Evidence of without prejudice negotiations is also admissible if its exclusion would act as a 
cloak for perjury, blackmail or other unambiguous impropriety.
49
 This exception targets a clear 
case of abuse of the rule's protection.
50
 For this reason the claimant in the Unilever case
51
 was 
not allowed to plead threats allegedly occurred at a without prejudice meeting, absent any 
evidence of oppressive, dishonest or dishonourable behaviour of the defendant. To a similar 
effect is the case of Savings & Investment Bank Ltd (In Liquidation) v Fincken. 
52
 The claimant 
could not plead additional particulars of the defendant's assets, which were disclosed at a 
without prejudice meeting subsequent to the swearing of the affidavit of means, because telling 
the truth did not constitute an abuse of the rule's protection even where the truth was contrary to 
the claimant's case. Recently, in Venture Investment Placement Ltd v Hall, 
53
 the claimant 
sought an interim injunction restraining the defendant from disclosing to any third parties what 
was said in a mediation meeting. In granting the application, Deputy Judge Reid QC held that it 
was not possible for the defendant to rely on the unambiguous impropriety exception, because 
there was a serious question to be tried as to whether anything said in the mediation could 
amount to impropriety.  
*C.J.Q. 198  Occasionally without prejudice communications may be useful to explain delay 
in commencing litigation or a party's apparent acquiescence to such delay.
54
 Lindley L.J. in 
Walker v Wilsher 
55
 noted that the court could have regard to the fact that without prejudice 
correspondences had been written and the dates at which they were written without infringing 
the rule. Robert Walker L.J. in Unilever 
56
 observed that the court might refer to fuller evidence 
in order to have a fair picture of the rights and wrongs of the delay. In practice, parties can get 
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round the limitation of this exception and rely on a wider range of evidence by negotiating 
“ without prejudice save as to costs” .  
There are situations in which disclosure of without prejudice communications in subsequent 
proceedings would be just, not because a party has acted improperly in settlement negotiations, 
but because it alleges to have reasonably mitigated its loss in reaching a compromise. Relying 
on the latter argument, the claimants in the Muller case
57
 sought from a third party the shortfall 
between the settlement monies and the loss suffered. However, they refused to disclose all the 
documents leading to the settlement except the letter before action and the settlement 
agreement. The Court of Appeal unanimously ordered disclosure of all the other relevant 
documents. Although Hoffmann L.J.'s reasoning must now be read in light of Ofulue v Bossert, 
58
 Swinton Thomas and Leggatt L.JJ. pointed out that the claimants waived the without 
prejudice protection by putting their own conduct in issue. Leggatt L.J. went further and said 
that the claimants' partial disclosure of privileged documents constituted an implied waiver, for 
it was a concept as implausible as the curate's egg. Muller may be contrasted with the recent 
first instance decision in Cumbria Waste Management Ltd & Lakeland Waste Management Ltd 
v Baines Wilson (A Firm). 
59
 In that case, the claimants sought the shortfall between the 
settlement monies and the amount invoiced from the defendants, who were not a party to a 
successful mediation involving the claimants. Here the other party to the mediation, not the 
claimants, resisted disclosure of the documents relating to the settlement. Her Honour Judge 
Kirkham, sitting as a High Court judge, found that the Muller exception did not apply.
60
 This 
must be correct; the Muller exception is narrow in scope in that the court gave no consideration 
to the right of the other party to the settlement negotiation to assert the rule's protection in 
subsequent proceedings in which it was not involved.  
The last group of exceptions refers to a distinct privilege analogous to the without prejudice 
rule. This privilege has developed in relation to family conciliation.
61
 Based on the public 
interest to maintain stability of marriage, it renders settlement negotiations in matrimonial and 
parental disputes inadmissible except where it is necessary to adduce such evidence for 
protecting the well-being of a child.
62
 The matrimonial and parental conciliation privilege 
lends support for the recent debate as to the possible existence of mediation privilege and the 
desirability for a *C.J.Q. 199  mediator's privilege in England and Wales. Ramsey J. in Farm 
Assist 
63
 said that there is no special privilege attached to the mediation process or the mediator. 
Nonetheless, Stuart Isaacs QC in Brown 
64
 made a positive note that the legislature or the 
judiciary may need to address this issue in the future.  
Waivers and exceptions apart, a without prejudice statement is admissible if it does not connect 
with the merits of the cause being litigated. Lord Griffiths acknowledged this in Rush & 
Tompkins Ltd v Greater London Council 
65
 where he referred to Waldridge v Kennison. 
66
 In 
Waldridge, the court admitted a without prejudice letter as evidence of the writer's handwriting, 
which was extraneous to the subject matter of the settlement negotiations. More recently, Lord 
Hope in Rashid 
67
 echoed that “ an admission which was made in plain terms is admissible, if it 
falls outside the area of the offer to compromise” .  
Contractual confidentiality   
Each of the restraints outlined above could lead to a loss of confidentiality in mediation. 
Attempts have been made to impose express obligations of confidentiality by contract. A 
typical mediation agreement contains, among other things, a duty not to disclose to any other 
person all information produced for, or arising out of or in connection with, the mediation 
passing between any participants and between any of them and the mediator, including the 
existence, outcome or termination of the mediation proceedings.
68
 The agreement may also 
provide that no party will call the mediator as a witness in any subsequent adjudication, 
arbitration, judicial or tribunal proceedings arising out of the same matter,
69
 unless the 
evidence is required by law, the life or safety of any person may be at serious risk, refusal to 
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testify would result in criminal proceedings against the mediator, or the evidence responds to a 
negligence claim against the mediator.
70
   
It is clear, however, that contractual confidentiality does not confer absolute immunity from 
disclosure in legal proceedings.
71
 The law requires the private interest in maintaining 
confidential relationships and the public interest in preserving confidences to be balanced 
against the administration of justice, which requires disclosure of all relevant information 
needed for the fair disposal of litigation.
72
 A good example is the Farm Assist case.
73
 In that 
case, the mediator could not excuse herself from the duty to comply with a witness summons 
by enforcing an express obligation not to divulge information in the mediation agreement or an 
implied duty of confidentiality arising out of the nature of *C.J.Q. 200  mediation. The right of 
confidentiality yielded to the interests of the administration of justice in receiving her 
testimonial evidence for the purpose of assessing whether economic duress invalidated the 
concluded compromise between the parties.  
For this reason, the protection afforded by contractual confidentiality is in general no wider 
than the without prejudice rule. Nonetheless, it may be the basis for the court to rule against 
production of mediation documents where exceptions to the without prejudice rule do not 
apply
74
 or to grant an interim injunction restraining a threatened breach of that 
confidentiality.
75
   
Legal professional privilege   
A better shield against disclosure obligations is legal professional privilege. Originally the 
privilege attached to confidential communications between lawyers and their clients in relation 
to contemplated or pending legal proceedings,
76
 recognising that full access to legal 
representation was an essential component for the right to fair trial.
77
 The privilege was later 
expanded to communications between the client or the lawyer with non-parties for the purpose 
of preparing for litigation. It also covers all legal advice,
78
 founded on rule of law 
considerations that the law can only be enjoyed and enforced if persons know them, understand 
their implications and arrange their affairs accordingly.  
Lord Bingham C.J. in Paragon Finance Plc v Freshfields 
79
 stated that generally the privilege 
offers an absolute level of protection:  
“ Save where client and legal adviser have abused their confidential relationship to facilitate 
crime or fraud, the protection is absolute unless the client (whose privilege it is) waives it, 
whether expressly or impliedly.”   
Lord Scott of Foscote in Three Rivers DC v Bank of England (No.6) 
80
 added that the privilege 
cannot be overridden as a matter of policy:  
“ If a communication or document qualifies for legal professional privilege, the privilege is 
absolute. It cannot be overridden by some supposedly greater public interest. It can be waived 
by the person, the client, entitled to it and it can be overridden by statute, but it is otherwise 
absolute. There is no balancing exercise that has to be carried out.”  Ramsey J. in Farm Assist 81 
clarified that a communication remains privileged even where the client shares it with the 
mediator on a confidential basis. Therefore, the client will be able to restrain the mediator from 
making any unauthorised use of those communications.  
*C.J.Q. 201  Comparative trends in mediation privilege   
As already seen, the common law protection for mediation confidentiality is more limited than 
is generally perceived. Parties communicate in mediation on a without prejudice basis, subject 
to a non-exhaustive list of recognised exceptions. Their right to enforce an express duty of 
contractual confidentiality yields to the interests of justice. They may claim legal professional 
privilege only for the client-lawyer or client/lawyer-third party communications made for 
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obtaining legal advice or preparing for litigation, unless there is an abuse in the confidential 
relationship or where a statutory exception applies. In practice, mediators should qualify the 
bold assurance that mediation is confidential and without prejudice in the opening statement. 
William Wood QC suggested that they inform mediation participants of the limits of 
confidentiality and provide them with a realistic sense of security
82
 :  
“ Many of you will know that confidentiality is never absolute and unqualified. I should warn 
you that there are a limited number of situations in which statements and documents arising in 
the mediation can be referred to subsequently either by one or both of you or by third parties 
with whom you subsequently get into litigation. These situations are in our experience 
relatively rare. If any of you are troubled by that possibility or wish to discuss it further then 
either I or your legal advisor will be happy [to] discuss it further. But I do repeat the 
all-important assurance that you can mediate today without your proposals or your position 
being referred to in the event that we do not settle and this case goes on to trial.”   
Mediators should also keep abreast of the prospect of mediation legislation in their countries. 
Notwithstanding the lack of an empirical nexis between confidentiality and success of 
mediation,
83
 the US and the EU relied upon policy reasons to provide qualified protection for 
mediation confidentiality in the form of a statutory privilege.  
The US Uniform Mediation Act
84
 creates a mediation communication privilege. 
Communications to initiate and participate in a mediation
85
 are protected, because they are 
considered essential for promoting candour of parties and public confidence, and for balancing 
the interests of justice against the private needs for confidentiality.
86
 Privileged 
communications are immune from compulsory disclosure and inadmissible in evidence
87
 in 
subsequent court proceedings or other adjudicative processes.
88
 Mediators and the parties are 
eligible to assert the privilege attached to a mediation communication.
89
 In addition, mediators 
and non-party participants are entitled to protect their own communications in the mediation.
90
   
*C.J.Q. 202  The privilege applies unless waived,
91
 precluded by reason of prejudicing another 
party in a proceeding
92
 or if it falls within one of the exceptions.
93
 The exceptions may be 
classified into two groups: where societal interest in a mediation communication outweighs the 
private interest in confidentiality
94
 ; and where the relative strengths of societal and private 
interests are left for the court to determine on a case by case basis.
95
 It should be noted that, 
unless agreed to the contrary, the privilege extends to international commercial mediation, 
overriding the narrower evidentiary exclusions under art.10 of the UNCITRAL Model Law on 
International Commercial Conciliation.
96
   
A similar development has been gaining currency in European law. The Mediation Directive
97
 
sets out five measures
98
 to encourage the use of mediation in cross-border disputes.
99
 Article 
7(1) provides that mediators can refuse to testify in judicial proceedings or arbitrations 
regarding any information arising out of or in connection with a mediation process, unless the 
parties agree, overriding considerations of public policy arise, or the disclosure is necessary in 
order to implement or enforce a concluded agreement. The qualified protection for mediation 
confidentiality is founded on empirical assumptions that confidentiality is important
100
 and 
fosters full and meaningful communications.
101
   
The Directive does not only guarantee the minimum level of confidentiality in cross-border 
mediation,102 but also stimulates a similar approach in domestic mediation. For example, 
Briggs J. advocated a mediator secrets privilege in the English legal system.
103
 The proposed 
privilege is justified by appeal to the unique role of a mediator to receive sensitive information 
from a party without communicating it across the divide, and to use the knowledge gained in 
guiding the parties towards a settlement. Analogous to legal professional privilege, the 
protection of mediation secrets is absolute save in the rare case of misconduct by the mediator. 
Conclusion   
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The without prejudice rule provides the foundation for amicable dispute resolution by 
rendering statements made in settlement negotiations inadmissible and immune from 
disclosure. The rule is subject to certain riders. It is now clear that the rule *C.J.Q. 203  and its 
exceptions apply to settlement discussions involving mediators. Express obligations of 
confidentiality in mediation agreements do not widen the limited protection afforded by the 
rule, as they must yield to the public interests in the administration of justice. Legal 
professional privilege adds strength but attaches only to communications made in a specific 
confidential relationship for particular purposes.  
As part of its drive to assure confidentiality in mediation, the US Uniform Mediation Act 
created a mediation communication privilege. The privilege is in two respects similar to the 
without prejudice rule: it has both the inadmissibility and immunity aspects, and offers a 
qualified protection. The major breakthrough is that not only parties to the mediation can assert 
the privilege, but also non-party participants and mediators. On the other hand, the EU 
Mediation Directive only established a privilege for mediators to refuse to testify in subsequent 
adjudicative proceedings. Unfortunately, it says nothing about the confidentiality conferred by 
the without prejudice rule.  
For the reasons outlined above there is a strong case for the introduction of a distinct mediation 
privilege. Indeed, such an introduction would bring English law into line with the European 
jurisprudence. Further, if it is accepted that mediation participants must have a more secure 
sphere to communicate effectively with mediators, then the law governing confidentiality 
requires some revision, because the present law provides insufficient protection to promote 
mediation as a dispute resolution procedure alternative to litigation.  
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